China’s Financial Markets, Their Problems and Options for Further Development

Undoubtedly, China has made impressive economic progress in the last three decades and continues to outperform most economies with an annual growth rate above 8.2% for 2009, even in the current global economic crisis (Xinhua, 2009). But many challenges remain, particularly regarding financial markets, the capital account, and monetary policy. The 2009 lending boom, huge foreign exchange reserves, a re-pegged renminbi (RMB) exchange rate to the US dollar, and capital controls are elements of an imbalanced economy and could have negative implications for China’s long-term future. This article discusses some of the problems and examines options to address them.


The Current Financial Situation in China: Problems and Issues
China’s Financial Markets Are Underdeveloped
The banking sector is dominated by the five biggest state-owned commercial banks that hold 52.6% of all Chinese banks’ assets and are utilized to direct credit mostly to preferred state-owned enterprises (SOE; cf. EIU, 2009). This situation has led in the past to inefficient capital allocation and bad loans. As recently as 2009 the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) of the Agricultural Bank of China for example was estimated to be at 23.5% (EIU, 2008), but this ratio has now declined on average for all Chinese commercial banks to 1.66% in October 2009 (People’s Daily, 2009). However, given the increase in 2009 in bank loans through November to RMB 9.21 trillion (compared to RMB 5.01tr in 2008; RTTNews, 2009), the NPL ratio could surge again.

It appears that most of China’s largest banks meet Basel standard’s tier 1 ratio of 4%, but China imposes stricter rules with 7% for tier 1 and 10% for tier 1 and 2 which are not met by all banks (e.g. the China Merchants Bank; cf. WSJ, 2009). Chinese banks are thus seen in need to raise additional capital of US$43bn soon to meet tougher standards; regulators have pushed for more caution due to the lending boom in 2009 (CNN, 2009).

Meanwhile, the separation between commercial banks, securities firms, and insurance companies seems to have softened as Chinese institutions face foreign competition. Credit rating/scoring systems are archaic and risk management is weak. Most credit card applications and credit scoring are processed manually and thus prone to errors. Even though policy initiatives aim to improve data collection and dissemination, information sharing among financial institutions appears to be limited (LA Times, 2008).

Capital markets are relatively small and weak (e.g. derivatives markets, cf. Kim, Lee & Shin, 2008; EIU, 2009). Corporate governance, accounting and auditing standards are inadequate and the rule of law is enforced arbitrarily. Financial repression and inefficient capital allocation generate large welfare costs (Prasad, 2008).

The Capital Account Is Gradually Opening Up and Capital Controls Become Less Effective
As the Asian Financial Crisis 1997/98 demonstrated, combining fixed exchange rates with financial liberalization could have disruptive effects. China’s capital inflows consist largely of FDI, which tends to be more long-term oriented and is associated with technology and managerial skill transfer. Interestingly, most of China’s (utilized) FDI inflows come from East Asia (not from the West), although the biggest chunk, 31.7% from Hong Kong (HK) involves probably a large share of round-tripping between mainland China and HK (figures for 2004, cf. Prasad & Wei, 2007).

China restricts foreign investment into RMB-denominated securities on the mainland. However, such capital controls have become leaky and are likely to be further undermined through gradual opening of cross-border capital flows. Even though China’s capital controls remain effective enough to allow the persistence of a gap between offshore (so-called non-deliverable forwards, NDF) and onshore forward rates of the RMB to the dollar (Ma & McCauley, 2008), politically unintended capital flows seem to increasingly occur both via the capital as well as the current account (due to e.g. remittances or investment income). Meanwhile, investment income flows out of China have stayed flat since 2000, which could imply that foreigners try to delay or cancel profit repatriation out of China to benefit from expected RMB appreciation and investment opportunities (Ma & McCauley, 2008).

The large and rising foreign exchange holdings of the central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), currently about US$ 2.3tr, provide some insurance against potential future financial shocks, but imply also large money inflows and impose costs (such as inefficient investment of foreign exchange reserves into low-yielding bonds abroad; cf. Wyplosz, 2008).

China’s Monetary Policy Has Insufficient Tools and Strives to Achieve Too Many Objectives Which Generates Trade-offs
The PBOC’s goals seems to include maintaining a GDP growth rate of at least 8%, inflation of about 3%, a stable exchange rate to the dollar and structural adjustment while pursuing money growth and interest rate targets (Yu, 2008). The PBOC incurs high costs in sterilizing capital inflows through the issuance (and roll-over) of low-yielding short-term bonds. Raising domestic interest rates would attract even more capital inflows (due to carry trades), which would put more appreciation pressure on the RMB. Reserve requirements were sometimes raised in the past as an alternative but they seem to become less effective as Chinese banks hold large excess surpluses, hence such regulatory adjustments may have not necessarily an impact on money supply (Yu, 2008). As China’s money markets are large but fragmented, they limit the influence of the PBOC’s interest rate policy on commercial bank lending. This situation has led to a “stop-and-go” monetary policy: Too much money growth is followed by too strong tightening and vice versa which reflects ineffective and clumsy tools and generates inefficiencies in the economy.


Financial Liberalization and Development: Policy Options
Despite mixed empirical evidence and short-term challenges, financial liberalization has many potential benefits, such as access to international capital markets, which could improve risk-sharing and the utilization of domestic savings for more efficient investments, lower costs of capital (as inefficient investments and cronyism will decrease), and improved intertemporal consumption smoothing opportunities. However, potential negative aspects include more exposure to international financial shocks which could lead to boom-and-bust cycles in the short run. In the longer term, financial liberalization may lead to strengthened institutions, which stabilize markets (Kaminsky & Schmuckler, 2007). To reap some of the benefits and avoid some of the pitfalls, China could implement the following options.

Further Gradually Internationalize the RMB and Make It More Flexible
If the RMB is fully convertible, the Chinese could trade in their own currency and incur fewer risks. A more flexible RMB could mitigate external shocks and reduce inflationary pressure arising from capital inflows compared to a peg. One step in this direction could be the expansion of the RMB trade settlement – which is currently restricted to ASEAN countries, HK and Macao – to all Asia and the rest of the world, after gaining some years of experience in the ASEAN region. Another option is the expansion of RMB bond issuance abroad and then allowing RMB deposit accounts abroad (likewise: first in Asia, then globally). If China’s growth rate picks up, the world economy recovers, capital flows (out of the dollar) into attractive investment opportunities increase, and the euro strengthens against the dollar, there might even be some room for putting the RMB back on an appreciation path linked to a currency basket (similar to 2005-2008; cf. the views of Prof. Keidel, Georgetown, in Batson, 2009).

To contain capital flow volatility and asset price bubbles, investment ceilings could be set for certain sectors. The creation of new investment opportunities (e.g. in China’s underdeveloped Central, Western and Northeastern provinces) could mitigate the run on few and geographically concentrated assets. A gradual RMB appreciation could hurt the export sector in the short run. But it also provides an opportunity to rebalance China’s economy and a coordinated policy response could help the country further climb up the supply chain to more sophisticated sectors which are less sensitive to exchange rate movements. Additionally, greater regional financial integration and policy coordination in the ASEAN+3 area could mitigate some potential risks.

Liberalize the Banking Sector, Privatize State-run Commercial Banks and Use Only Policy Banks for State-directed Lending
A liberalized banking sector may reduce credit-rationing against SME, induce more efficient capital allocation due to increased competition and may further stimulate domestic financial development. Politically driven lending could be restricted to only two domestic policy banks run by the central government, i.e. the Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC) and the China Development Bank (CDB). The privatization of state-run commercial banks allows them to operate more efficiently, generates revenues, and reduces risks such as NPL emanating from political interference. Competition in the banking sector could be strengthened further by allowing foreign institutions full market access.

Further Open Up the Capital Account and Diversify Foreign Exchange Holdings
A more open capital account implies not only advantages stemming from incoming capital, but allows Chinese capital to be invested abroad without restrictions which could help to diversify portfolio risks and to strengthen financial market development. Similarly, the gradual diversification of China’s sovereign foreign exchange assets combined with their partial transfer from the PBOC into Chinese sovereign wealth funds not only reduces dependence on the US dollar, but is also likely to increase the return on these assets. As Chinese capital outflows increase due to more liberal regulations, speculative appreciation pressure on the RMB could be reduced. Increasing Chinese outward foreign direct investments could support China’s global quest for commodities.

Steps in this direction could be the expansion and liberalization of the Qualified Foreign/Domestic Institutional Investor (QFII and QDII) programs, the promotion of foreign listings by Chinese firms and local listings by foreign firms, and relaxations on foreign exchange accounts in China. To mitigate foreign fears of many Chinese takeovers of foreign firms, China could strengthen the separation of business and political interests, and improve domestic corporate governance. China could seek to establish bi- or (even better) multilateral investment treaties that clarify rules and limits of cross-border investments and reduce protectionism and discretionary blocks. These treaties would also help win foreign investor confidence in the mainland.

Focus monetary policy on inflation targeting and GDP growth
A more flexible RMB and more cross-border capital flows allow the PBOC to focus on fewer goals and reduce the need for sterilization. A reduction in the number of interest rates and the unification/standardization of capital markets could help the development of a benchmark interest rate which increases monetary policy effectiveness in liquidity management (Yu, 2008). This move would improve the utilization and effectiveness of monetary tools and could help achieve financial stability, growth and low inflation (Prasad, 2009).


Conclusion
China’s financial markets are growing, but are still relatively weak and underdeveloped. The hike in bank lending in 2009 (and a still above average lending level in 2010) could bring back the problem with NPL. China’s capital controls still work, but gaps have arisen. Monetary policy tools are no longer able to fully sterilize, thus enabling unwanted capital flows to occur. The central bank’s effectiveness is constrained by trade-offs arising from a multitude of objectives and targets. Policy tools often over- or undershoot the targets and resorting to clumsy measures such as reserve requirements is inefficient.

Financial liberalization can offer many benefits, but can entail also pitfalls. The development of China’s financial market could be further supported by carefully calibrated and sequenced liberalization steps. First, the gradual internationalization of the RMB could reduce transition risks before reaching full convertibility. A more flexible exchange rate fixed to a currency basket could reduce inflation pressure from inflowing capital, guide expectations and thus reduce currency speculations. Second, a liberalized banking sector would benefit SME by allocating capital more efficiently and reduce NPL risks. Competition and market development could be strengthened by relaxing restrictions on foreign competition. Third, opening the capital account, i.e. reducing restrictions on cross-border capital flows, can help portfolio diversification. A shift of China’s foreign exchange reserves into more non-dollar assets and into a wider variety of securities can bring higher returns and less sensitivity to the dollar. Fourth, a monetary policy focus on inflation in combination with the first three points allows a more effective policy implementation and supports financial development.

As China’s growth rate will rise again in 2010, NPL, asset bubbles, and inflation could become core concerns and monetary as well as fiscal policy could start to tighten slowly. It will be very interesting to follow how policymakers react to new challenges, what tools they employ, and how effective they will be.


References
Batson, A. (2009, December 3). “Rethinking the Chinese Yuan’s Re-Peg to the Dollar”. Wall Street Journal Blog. Retrieved December 10, 2009 from: http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2009/12/03/rethinking-the-chinese-yuans-re-peg-to-the-dollar/
CNN (2009, November 25). Capital Crunch for Chinese Banks. Retrieved December 20, 2009 from: http://edition.cnn.com/2009/BUSINESS/11/24/china.banks.lending.ft/index.html
[EIU] Economist Intelligence Unit (2008). Country Finance: China.
EIU (2009). Country Finance: China.
Kaminsky, G. L. & Schmuckler, S. (2007). Short-Run Pain, Long-Run Gain: Financial Liberalization and Stock Market Cycles. Retrieved December 19, 2009 from: http://home.gwu.edu/~graciela/HOME-PAGE/RESEARCH-WORK/WORKING-PAPERS/booms-crashes.pdf
Kim, S., Lee, J.-W. & Shin, K. (2008). “Regional and Global Financial Integration in East Asia”, in B. Eichengreen, C. Wyplosz & Y. C. Park, (eds.), China, Asia, and the New World Economy (pp. 168-200). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
LA Times (2008, October 22). China Charges Into Credit Cards. Retrieved December 20, 2009 from: http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/22/business/fi-chinacredit22
Ma, G. & McCauley, R. (2008). “Do China’s Capital Controls Still Bind?”, in B. Eichengreen, C. Wyplosz & Y. C. Park, (eds.), China, Asia, and the New World Economy (pp. 312-340). Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Available online as BIS Working Paper 233 from: http://www.bis.org/publ/work233.htm]
People’s Daily (2009, October 29). NPL Ratio of Commercial Banks in China Down. Retrieved December 20, 2009: http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90859/6798344.html
Prasad, E. & Wei, S.-J. (2007). “The Chinese Approach to Capital Inflows: Patterns and Possible Explanations”, in S. Edwards, Capital Controls and Capital Flows in Emerging Economies: Policies, Practices and Consequences (pp. 421-480). Conference held December 16-18, 2004, Published in May 2007, University of Chicago Press. Retrieved December 15, 2009 from: http://papers.nber.org/chapters/c0158.pdf
Prasad, E. S. (2008). “Is the Chinese Growth Miracle Built to Last?”, China Economic Review, 20(1), pp. 103-123.
RTTNews (2009, December 11). Chinese Bank lending Increases in November. Retrieved December 20, 2009 from: http://www.rttnews.com/Content/AsianEconomicNews.aspx?Node=B2&id=1154229
[WSJ] Wall Street Journal (2009, November 24). China Banking Regulator Gets Tough on Capital Rules. Retrieved December 22, 2009 from: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703819904574553571535733270.html
Wyplosz, C. (2008). “Is East Asia Safe from Financial Crises?”, in B. Eichengreen, C. Wyplosz & Y. C. Park, (eds.), China, Asia, and the New World Economy (pp. 233-253). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Xinhua (2009, December 15). ADB Raises 2009 Growth Forecast for Developing Asia to 4.5%. Retrieved December 19, 2009 from: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-12/15/content_12652454.htm
Yu, Y. (2008). “Chinese Macroeconomic Management: Issues and Prospects”, in B. Eichengreen, C. Wyplosz & Y. C. Park, (eds.), China, Asia, and the New World Economy (pp. 254-273). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kennen Sie die Geschichte des Herrn Wilhelm Würmli?

Vor langer Zeit da war eine Bauernrepublik. Das Speissbürgertum schaute auf die Bauern wie Wilhelm Würmli herab. Die Landwirte wiederum waren unter der Fuchtel des Landadels und der Kirche, und obwohl sie jedem misstrauten, wurden sie gleichwohl von jedem irgendwie missbraucht und getäuscht.
Dank seiner politischen Stabilität zog das Land seit je Flüchtlinge an, und Wilhelm war skeptisch ob der Neuankömmlinge, die anders sprachen, assen und neue Dinge lehrten. Napoleon kam und änderte vieles, doch er ging bald wieder. Einige seiner Dinge blieben aber, und haben später zu Veränderungen geführt. Die Eisenbahn zog ins Land, und das Volk, misstrauisch wie immer, fürchtete den schwarzen Rauch, wie es auch Pockenimpfungen fürchtete, und Blitzableiter. Doch Wilhelm lernte, wie diese Sachen funktionieren, und dass sie ihm halfen, und akzeptierte sie schliesslich. Die Migranten brachten auch Schokolade, und das Volk liebte dies gar so, dass es mittlerweile wohl Weltmeister im Schokoladeverzehr ist. Und die Migranten halfen, den schwarzen Rauch bei der Eisenbahn wegzumachen, und sie schneller zu machen. Es kamen Banken auf, es zogen Flugzeuge ins Land, Computer und sogar Partikelbeschleuniger.
Es kamen auch neue Bauten auf und Herr Würmli, wie seine übrigen Landsleute war skeptisch. Nach langem Beraten wurden die ägyptischen Hotels dann gebaut, mitten in den Alpen nahe an einem mythischen Pass. Die neu geplanten Türme jedoch, ohne Glocken, waren dem Volk des Teufels. Wilhelm erinnerte sich an die Geschichte des Turmbaus zu Babel, und dass dieser im Chaos endete. So wurden die Türme verboten; man hatte Angst und man verstand sie nicht. Man vestand die Banken auch nicht, die scheinbar toxische Dinge mischten, und verbot auch sie. Die jüngeren Migranten, mittlerweile sesshaft geworden, zogen als nun Einhemische weg in ferne Ländereien, da sie sich nicht mehr verstanden fühlten. Nur die alten Migranten, die über mehrere Generationen kamen, blieben, da sie mittlerweile dachten wie Familie Würmli. Und diese neue Medizin, die mit dem Erbgut arbeitet, wurde auch gleich verboten; man solle ja nicht Gott spielen und Gottes Strafe in Form von Krankheiten ausweichen, so wie damals beim Blitzableiter, dachte Wilhelm.
Doch etwas war anders als früher. Wilhelm und seine Landsleute wussten nicht mehr, wie sie für sich selbst sorgen konnten, ohne all die neuen Sachen. So wurde jeder wieder Bauer, aber ohne das fremde Saatgut oder anderen fremden Firlefanz. Einige waren (wieder) gleicher als andere, belehrten jene und trichterten ihnen Sitten ein. Willi und seine Kollegen waren misstrauisch, wie immer, aber gehorchten den Tonangebenden, die vesprachen das Land zu beschützen und die die Bauern wieder wie damals täuschten. Und Türme gab es nur mehr aus Stein und nur mit Glocken. Und das Land wurde wieder eine arme Bauernrepublik.



Inspiriert durch das Buch “Der modernen Schweiz entgegen: Heinrich Zschokke prägt den Aargau” von Werner Ort (2003, Baden: Verlag hier+jetzt).

aha ... he is no protectionist?

No protectionism, but bending to the tire workers and manufacturing unions, by accepting the ITC recommendation to raise tariffs on imported Chinese tires....
In contrast, it seems that Mr. Bush never followed an ITC recommendation to inhibit imports (and thus trade).
The loser is the consumer ... and, if the vicious circle continues, global welfare. Who knows, maybe this brings us faster to the necessary macro adjustments that probably need to take place in the next one or two decades ...


http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14450332

Swiss Pavilion at EXPO 2010 - in Shanghai

Have you ever dreamt of riding on a ski-lift downtown a metropolis?
Next year, it's your chance!!! The Swiss Pavilion at the Expo 2010 in Shanghai features the original Swiss ski-lift that takes you on a tour through the pavilion.

more on
http://www.swisspavilion.ch/en/home.html

Asia's Growth is Back

.. and even the Japanese grow again, at an annualied 3.7% in Q2 2009. However, this is nothing against Singapore's Q2 growth of an annualized rate of over 20%...



http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/16/AR2009081602331.html

Banking, Switzerland, Risk Management and the Ability to Change

Unfortunately, Switzerland is again in the news, ahem ... in the bad news. After the Nazi gold debate of the 1990, the country faces since 2007 increased scrutiny surrounding the buzz words "tax haven" and once more the Swiss Banking Secrecy is at the top of the controversial topics.

While Germany attacked Liechtenstein extremly rude in early 2008 regarding its Trust legislation (possibly enabling many Germans to hide their wealth from the German fiscal authorities) and later on also Switzerland, the case UBS has been in the news ever since then. Some bank seniors have been pursued in actively helping Americans hiding their money from the IRS with fancy methods. Now the IRS wants to see 52'000 accounts and names of potential Americans that have deposits at UBS. This of course would violate the Swiss Banking Law and its secrecy article which forbids governments (also the Swiss one) to have access to account information.

The banking secrecy - whatever some conspiracy theorists and pessimists may believe - has a long tradition and was never intended to protect dictators, terror financiers and rogue people.
The banking secrecy is fundamentally an expression of a very liberal, libertarian principle, i.e. constrain the size of government and thus protect privacy of individuals. The state should not have the capacity to raid people's savings and expropriate their wealth. Thus, the law intends to protect privacy and people's (property) rights. This only seemingly contradicts taxation requirements and law enforcement.
Over the years, Swiss legislation and banks have developed sophisticated tools to make sure that people's wealth is subject to taxes, i.e. it cannot simply disappear and become grey. With a withholding or sourcing tax of 35% on interest earnings, it incentivizes people to declare their proper wealth on their tax forms. Moreover, the banking commission has set standards against money laundering and banks try to track down financial flows of potentially illegal activities. I don't say this is done in a perfect and watertight fashion. As some notorious examples in the past have shown, it is and will probably always be possible to hide money. Even with the most advanced tools and technological background it may not be possible to clean up perfectly.

Instead of further developing and fine-tuning this banking system that both protects privacy but allows to prevent and track money laundering, the current fuzz may submit a potentially devastating blow to it.
Even though it is not clear how the causa UBS and USA will end, it may well have adverse effects on how (Western) banks cooperate, comply with the law and how they try out of self-interest to reduce illegal activities. Given that international finance is so vast, fluid, fast and dynamic, one should be careful in assuming that with a swift action e.g. by the OECD, the US or the Germans (even the British have some special interests, some say, to further boost their financial center) the problem is solved.

If the last two years of international pressure, Swiss banking activities and the actions of the Swiss government have taught us, then it is the inadequate (again) response of Swiss institutions to crises and international pressure. It is striking how fast the government, banks and other institutions have partially reigned in to the pressure, partially fell into the old habit of resisting as if nothing has happened in the belief that staying ignorant would be the best strategy for survival. The response was chaotic, and seems to show a lack of a risk management concept.

Despite calls to build up a strategic framework to strengthen its voice abroad, improve understanding abroad and coordinate policies at home, not enough was done in advance. Given the complicated political system in Switzerland, it may also be very likely that it stays this way: a few crises here and there, a few critics here and there, but overall the self-righteous conviction that everything still is ok, and we're fine.
Switzerland lost its once leading positions in research, education, its competitiveness is limited to a few industries, while many economic sectors are protected and isolated. And many do not seem to see the huge challenges laying ahead.
Is this country able to change?






Source:
http://www.nzz.ch/nachrichten/wirtschaft/aktuell/die_wut_der_alten_kmpen_1.3181743.html

Congratulations from the Mainland to the Island! WOW!

What a move! Mr. Hu congratulates Mr. Ma to his non-contested election as Kuomintang chairman. How cool that this happens just at the right time to have some teasers for the beginning of the US-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue that started today, July 27, 2009, in Washington DC. This was also the reason why I could not take the tunnel under 14th street from the Reagan Building to the Hoover Building (Commerce Dept).

The election could reinforce Ma's consiliatory approach to the PRC within the KMT. Additionally, many in the PRC assume that - since PRC does not accept Ma's title as president of Taiwan - that only this election to party chairman allows him the posture to get invited to the mainland. However, a re-approchement takes time and probably both sides are not yet ready for too much schmoozing. For this, there is not enough trust, and too much fear on the island.
Maybe, a real trust building measure would not just be a telegram from Beijing, but the (partial) scrapping or reduction of its missiles targetting Formosa?

At least: nice words are better than the ugly words a few years back!



http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/28/world/asia/28taiwan.html?ref=world